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3I. INTRODUCTION: APPLES AND ORANGES?
In December 1997, after days and nights of bargaining that culminated two
years of hard negotiations, representatives of 160 governments wearily agreed
in Kyoto, Japan, on a protocol to supplement the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. It was hoped that this “ Kyoto
Protocol”  would represent a major step forward by the international community
to mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases that could alter future climate.
Before long, however, doubts emerged on whether the treaty was
implementable, and even whether enough governments would ratify to allow its
entry into force as international law. Nearly two years later (November 1999), a
mere 16 nations – mostly small island states -- had ratified. None were
significant emitters of greenhouse gases.
Just a decade earlier, only 24 countries had signed the Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. This treaty, however, entered into
force within 15 months, has been ratified by 168 nations, and has entered into
the annals of diplomacy as a landmark in the history of international
cooperation. The heads of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) described the 1987
Montreal Protocol as “ one of the great international achievements of the
century.”  (Bojkov 1995)
Much has been written about the pathbreaking nature of the ozone accord. Its
unexpected success was viewed as an encouraging sign that the world would
now be able to cooperate in addressing such other long-term environmental
threats as climate change and diminishing biological diversity. The Montreal
Protocol was mined for pertinent lessons for the future.
(Lang 1996, French 1997, Benedick 1998a)
However, negotiations over climate change, from their very inception in
Chantilly, Virginia, in February 1991, have been marked by persistent disarray
among the negotiating parties on the necessity and feasibility of strong early
4measures to remodel the world’s energy structure. Proponents of decisive
action became increasingly frustrated by the continuing hesitancy on the
diplomatic front – a lack of zeal that was manifested, ironically, by many of the
same nations that have been traditional leaders on ozone, air and water quality,
wildlife and other environmental issues, notably Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States.
Environmental advocates attributed the negotiating problems not to flaws in the
international approach to climate, but rather to short-sighted politics, selfish
pecuniary interests, and unenlightened lifestyles of a few rich countries. The
arguments on all sides became increasingly shrill, the rhetoric more
inflammatory. Irritation over the climate stalemate led some revisionists to label
the Montreal Protocol as an easy victory that has no relevance for the more
complex subject of climate change. Ozone layer and climate change? It
seemed like comparing apples and oranges.
The scientific and socioeconomic variables associated with global climate are
indeed more complicated than those that faced the negotiators of the Montreal
Protocol. However, this alone is not a satisfactory explanation for the continuing
disputes over restricting anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Far from
being disqualified, the ozone experience offers lessons that are fundamental to
understanding why the climate negotiations so far have been so unproductive.
II. MONTREAL: AN UNLIKELY SUCCESS STORY
As an historian once observed, all revolutions seem impossible before they
occur -- and inevitable afterwards. Now that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) has
become a household word, we forget the global firestorm of controversy that
was provoked by a technical article written in 1974 by two scientists at the
Universe of California at Irvine. Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina
hypothesized that certain anthropogenic chemicals could damage ozone
molecules 30 to 50 kilometers above the Earth’s surface. (Molina and Rowland
1974) If true, the theory had portentous implications, since the evolution of life
was possible only because this fragile layer of stratospheric ozone absorbs
5dangerous ultraviolet radiation (UVB) from the sun. Twenty-one years later,
Rowland and Molina would receive a Nobel Prize for their discovery, but at the
time, their theory was attacked and derided. The earliest chronicle of the ozone
history bore the apt title, The Ozone War (Dotto and Schiff 1978).
When a handful of governments convened in Stockholm in 1982 to begin
negotiating an international agreement on the problem, no gambler would have
wagered that their deliberations would lead just eight years later to the banning
of all CFCs and related chemicals. Indeed, the first result of their arduous
negotiations, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, did not even mention CFCs – it was essentially merely a plea for more
research.
Was the Montreal Protocol inevitable? We may have forgotten that CFCs,
which had been invented in the 1930’s, were for decades considered ideal
chemicals. Nontoxic, nonflammable, noncorrosive, cheap and easy to produce,
CFCs and their bromine cousins, the halons, were by the 1970’s finding an
ever-widening range of uses in thousands of products and processes across
dozens of industries. Food processing, plastics, solvents, cleaners, air-
conditioning, fire fighting, defense, aerospace, oil rigs, computers, pharma-
ceuticals, telecommunications, home products, industrial chillers, insulation, are
only a sampling of the extent of their utility. Their benefits were virtually
synonymous with modern standards of living and, except for aerosol sprays, no
feasible alternatives to them existed. Industry warned that restricting their use
would jeopardize nearly $400 billion in capital investment and hundreds of
thousands of jobs worldwide. (Benedick 1998a:134)
We may also have forgotten that large producing nations, together accounting
for two-thirds of global production -- the European Union, Japan, and the then-
Soviet Union -- adamantly opposed strong limits on CFCs. The United States
was the only major producer to endorse meaningful controls; it was joined by a
few small consumers/producers: Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Most of the rest of the world was indifferent,
epitomized in the remark to me by an Indian diplomat: “ rich man’s problem --
rich man’s solution.”
6Most significant of all, we may have forgotten that during the entire negotiating
period from 1982 to the protocol signing in 1987, there was absolutely no
scientific evidence either of ozone depletion caused by CFCs, or of any of the
predicted negative consequences – higher levels of UVB radiation at Earth’s
surface, increased incidence of skin cancer and cataracts, defects in the
human immune system, damage to crops and marine life. The case for
international controls was based entirely on arcane theories of complex
chemical-physical interactions and computer model predictions of remote trace
gases that were measured in concentrations as minute as parts per trillion.
Ironically, the scientists advised us not to consider the only evidence of actual
ozone depletion at hand – a dramatic but temporary seasonal thinning of the
ozone layer over Antarctica that was unexpectedly revealed by British balloon-
based measurements in 1983, after having been overlooked in more
sophisticated satellite data. The processes at work here were poorly
understood, and there were at the time plausible explanations for the Antarctic
event other than CFCs. Interestingly, scientists had more confidence in their
theoretical models that predicted a gradual thinning of ozone over the mid-
latitudes rather than a precipitous but transitory collapse over the South Pole.
The “ ozone hole”  had even diminished in 1986 – just before protocol
negotiations began; scientists did not yet know of the quasi-biennial oscillation,
and thus could not be sure whether these data signaled a reversal of the
depletion trend. Scientists warned me then that if we based our case on the
Antarctic phenomenon and it turned out that CFCs were not to blame, the
chances for reaching an agreement on strong controls would be severely
undermined. (Benedick 1998a:19-20)
Only a few weeks before the final negotiating round in Montreal, many
knowledgeable observers did not believe an agreement would emerge. In the
face of these not trivial obstacles, what made the Montreal Protocol
memorable?
7III. LESSONS FROM THE OZONE LAYER
Out of the many important aspects of the ozone history, I would like to highlight
five factors that appear most relevant to the climate negotiations: (1) the role of
science and scientists; (2) the necessity for strong and consistent leadership;
(3) the flexible design of the Montreal Protocol; (4) the technological revolution
that emerged from public-private sector partnership; and (5) the involvement of
developing countries in the solution.
1. Science played a crucial role not only in uncovering the threat to the ozone
layer, but also in the diplomatic efforts to address the danger. Without the
constant involvement of scientists, the Montreal Protocol could never have
become a reality. Spearheaded by American scientific agencies -- the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) -- a remarkable
cooperative international venture was launched in 1984 involving over 150
scientists from many nations. The result, published by WMO and UNEP in
1986, was the most comprehensive analysis of stratospheric chemistry and
physics ever undertaken: three volumes containing over 1,100 pages of
text, plus 86 reference pages listing hundreds of peer-reviewed articles.
(WMO/UNEP 1986). Scientists also collaborated to develop ever more
refined instruments to measure the gases, as well as sophisticated
computer models to predict the implications of physical/chemical processes.
An international scientific consensus was not by itself, however, a sufficient
precondition for policy action. Scientists had to leave their laboratories and
assume, alongside the diplomats, an unfamiliar share of responsibility for
the policy implications of their findings. For their part, political and economic
decision makers needed to fund relevant research and to work together with
scientists on realistic assessments of the risks.
2. While the consequences of ozone layer depletion could be devastating,
they were unproved during the negotiations. Nevertheless, it was essential
to impose preventive controls well before significant impacts were recorded,
because the long atmospheric lifetimes of CFCs meant that it would take
decades for the ozone layer to recover. Since most governments at the start
8were unwilling to undertake meaningful actions, strong and decisive
leadership was needed to push the negotiations forward.
This leadership was provided by the United States, and by UNEP under its
Egyptian Executive Director, Mostafa Tolba. Tolba employed his credentials
as a scientist and his personal credibility with developing nations on behalf
of a strong treaty. His logic and compassion made Tolba an eloquent
spokesman for the interests of future generations.
For its part, the U.S. State Department designed a diplomatic campaign to
counteract the influence over the European Union (EU) of such powerful
companies as Imperial Chemical Industries and France’s Atochem, while
cultivating discreet support behind the EU communal curtain from Belgium,
Denmark, and Germany. At the same time, we sent diplomatic and scientific
teams to try and persuade the other two major producers -- Japan and the
Soviet Union -- as well as developing nations, to support strong controls.
There were fascinating aspects of this diplomatic strategy. We initiated, for
example, an unusual Cold War space-agency research cooperation -- an
“ ozone glasnost.”  We also dispatched representatives of American
environmental groups to motivate their British counterparts to raise
embarrassing questions in Parliament, an inspiration that elicited a formal
protest from Her Majesty’s Government over my involvement. In the end,
Japan and the Soviet Union unexpectedly joined the U.S. and its allies at
Montreal. The EU, now isolated and under pressure from its internal
dissenters, was forced to compromise, and the protocol became reality. The
United Kingdom (U.K.) later became a vigorous advocate of CFC phaseout.
(Benedick 1998a: chapter 6)
3. Scientific uncertainties decisively influenced the protocol’s design. U.S.
negotiators realized that a total ban on ozone depleting substances was
neither justified by existing scientific knowledge nor politically feasible.
Therefore, in place of the immutable commitments of traditional treaties, the
protocol was deliberately drafted to constitute a dynamic and flexible
process. The “ spirit of Montreal,”  which became a hallmark of later
negotiations to strengthen the protocol, was to proceed incrementally in
9small, cumulative steps, rather than to reach for over-ambitious targets that
would only serve to harden opposition.
The key element was the establishment of independent expert panels to
provide periodic reassessments of scientific, technological, and economic
developments. These panels eventually involved hundreds of specialists
from the research community and the private sector worldwide, constituting
an unparalleled body of expertise available to the parties to the protocol.
When serious differences arose during negotiations, the parties regularly
returned to the panels with requests for new technical analyses of policy
options. Linking the protocol consistently with the science proved an
effective method to minimize confrontation and, step-by-step, to gradually
overcome opposition to stronger measures. The result was that the political
consensus held together as the number of controlled chemicals grew from
an original 8 to more than 90, while phaseout periods were gradually
introduced and then systematically tightened. Based on the expert findings,
the protocol was significantly strengthened through amendments at the
Meetings of Parties in London in 1990, Copenhagen in 1992, Vienna in
1995, and Montreal in 1997. (Benedick 1998a:218-224, 319-320)
4. The Montreal Protocol was technology forcing in the sense that, at the time
of its signing in 1987, replacements were unavailable for nearly all uses of
ozone depleting substances. The cooperation of industry was fostered by a
combination of factors: targets that were challenging without being
impossible, the engagement of governments and international agencies,
and the gradually compelling nature of the science. As a result, the initially
monolithic industry opposition was undermined and more progressive
elements were stimulated to look for solutions.
By unleashing the creative energies of the private sector, a technological
revolution was achieved even where alternatives had been considered
impossible. Governments, international agencies, research institutes and
environmental organizations often collaborated with private firms in the
search for substitutes. Rival chemical producers were encouraged to
cooperate in toxicity testing and other studies on possible replacements.
User companies in the telecommunications sector, such as Northern
10
Telcom and AT&T, did not wait for the chemical industry, but reexamined
their own manufacturing processes and came up with approaches, e.g., to
cleaning microchips, that were even cheaper and more effective than the
once-indispensable CFCs. Governments adopted market-oriented policies
and incentives, and the resultant competitive forces helped to lower costs
and to bring new alternatives quickly to market. Successful innovation in
some fields gave the parties confidence to accept stronger controls in
others. (Cook 1996, Benedick 1998a:197-202)
5. In order to address the global problem effectively, it was essential that all
nations – North and South – abjure use of ozone depleting substances.
Otherwise, efforts of the richer countries would eventually be swamped by
developing countries with their rapidly rising populations and aspirations for
economic growth. Here, again, the Montreal Protocol offers relevant
lessons.
The industrialized countries from the start accepted the principle that they
would take earlier and stronger measures than the poorer nations. Attempts
by some populous developing countries to promote upper-use limits on a
per capita basis were firmly rejected. Instead, a ten-year grace period was
agreed before developing nations had to accept obligations. Surprisingly,
even this provision turned out to be mainly symbolic in importance.
Developing nations moved faster than expected to replace CFCs, as the
North followed through on commitments to ensure that new technologies
would expeditiously be made available, and that incremental costs would be
compensated through a special multilateral fund.
Varied creative initiatives promoted the transfer of technology. Consortia of
private companies, environmental organizations, and international agencies
diffused new products and processes to developing countries. Greenpeace
invested in an East German company to develop CFC-free refrigerators that
were later distributed in China and India through the German and Swiss
official aid programs. A UNEP information clearing house and training
workshops reinforced efforts to spread technological innovations.
As technology transfer became a reality rather than just words in a treaty,
the developing countries became eager to obtain new technologies as
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rapidly as possible. One result was the frustration of India’s hopes to
become the monopoly supplier of CFCs in growing Third World markets.
India had utilized the grace period to expand CFC capacity in a calculated
attempt to replace the North as its production phased out. But India found
itself with overcapacity as its neighbors closed their doors to the outdated
products. The availability of modern technologies stimulated the South to
assume stronger commitments, and most developing countries will now
achieve phaseout of most substances well ahead of their agreed schedules.
(Benedick 1998a: chapter 16)
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROAD TO RIO
Worries about global warming are not new. More than 40 years ago two
scientists at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Roger Revelle and Hans
Suess, warned that the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
resulting from fossil fuel combustion represents “ a large scale geophysical
experiment”  on the planet. (Revelle and Suess 1957) As data in subsequent
years confirmed a rapid increase in atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide and other long-lived greenhouse gases, scientific concern mounted
over possible future adverse effects, especially since disruptions in the forces
that influence climate would not be easily reversible.
In 1985, WMO and UNEP, in cooperation with the International Council of
Scientific Unions, convened a scientific conference in Villach, Austria, that
attracted political notice when it concluded:
“ Many important economic and social decisions are being made today on
long-term projects ... based on the assumption that past climatic data ...
are a reliable guide to the future. This is no longer a good assumption
since the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases are expected to
cause a significant warming of the global climate in the next century.”
(Bolin et.al. 1986)
Even greater political attention focused on climate at the 1988 Toronto
Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security.
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This conference, convened by the Canadian government together with WMO
and UNEP, brought together representatives of government, industry,
environmental organizations, and research institutes. For the first time at this
level, recommendations called for negotiation of a global convention containing
specific targets and timetables to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.
Other international conferences followed, and climate change and the ozone
layer were even discussed at annual summits of the Group of Seven, the
leaders of the major Western industrialized nations.
Coincidentally, the public was becoming increasingly sensitized to
anthropogenic disturbance of atmospheric systems by the confirmation in 1988
that CFCs were indeed responsible for the Antarctic ozone hole, and by
concerns in Europe and North America over acid rain and forest damage. In
the same year, extreme storms over Europe, record heat waves and drought in
North America, and weather anomalies elsewhere in the world heightened
public attention to the possibility of changing climate. Mass media
sensationalized the issue with cover stories portraying famous landmarks (e.g.,
New York’s Empire State Building) partially submerged by raging tides.
The year 1988 was also significant for the establishment of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an event that was not
without controversy. Previously, an eminent but largely self-selected scientific
advisory group had issued pronouncements on climate at Villach and
elsewhere under WMO and UNEP auspices. The IPCC idea, modeled after the
successful experience of the 1984-85 ozone assessment mentioned above,
was first raised in 1987 by myself and others with the aim of expanding the
small group into a larger entity under governmental auspices.
Some environmental advocates opposed the concept, fearing that
governments would co-opt the scientific process and distort the findings for
political purposes. I and other supporters of change, however, argued that
expansion of the informal group into an official panel would enhance its
credibility and influence – and that, moreover, scientists would not allow
themselves to be manipulated. As it turned out, the IPCC did operate with an
independence that occasionally made governments uncomfortable. Drawing on
the ozone experience, the IPCC became an ongoing series of roundtables,
workshops, and reports, eventually involving over two thousand scientists and
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researchers from many nations, organizations, and industries in data gathering,
analysis, and debate. (IPCC 1991, 1996)
Based on initial IPCC findings, the UN General Assembly in December 1990
created the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Climate Change,
aiming at a convention for signature at the 1992 UN Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The negotiations proved very
difficult, since greenhouse gas emissions were inextricably linked with energy,
industry, land use, and transportation policies – the building blocks of modern
economies, both North and South. The interrelated aspects of the problem
meant that there were no quick or obvious solutions. Mitigation policies would
entail major changes in the ways that people lived, worked, and consumed.
Nations would have to significantly reduce their dependence on fossil fuels,
which accounted for more than half of greenhouse gas emissions. Agricultural
practices that caused emissions of nitrous oxide and methane would need to
be modified. The widespread destruction of forests and savannas would have
to be curtailed, as these practices not only released carbon dioxide but also
removed a critical sink for absorbing emissions from other sources. Since all
these factors were related to the needs of poor people in developing countries,
issues of poverty and population growth were also central to mitigating climate
change.
Widely varying national interests had to be reconciled in the climate
negotiations. Regions and countries differ considerably in their vulnerability and
in their capacity to adapt to climate change. Prospects are least favorable for
the poorest countries, especially low-lying small island states, delta regions,
and arid areas of Africa, South America, and Central and South Asia. Countries
also differ in their industrial and transportation structure, in their natural
resource base, and in their dependence on fossil fuels. China, with almost 1.3
billion people striving for higher standards of living, is unlikely to forego use of
cheap coal, of which it possesses approximately one third of known global
reserves, in the absence of feasible alternatives. Other rapidly industrializing
countries such as India, Mexico, South Korea and Thailand share similar views
on energy use. Norway and Australia are major coal exporters. Countries with
large forested areas, such as Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia and Zaire, resist
attempts by the North to dictate how they may use their national patrimony.
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United States prosperity is heavily dependent on domestic coal and imported
oil. The economies of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and others rest on oil
exports. Even New Zealand, with more sheep than people, is cautious about
imposing controls on methane emissions. (Benedick 1997a)
V. THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Notwithstanding the difficulties, the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC) was signed on schedule in June 1992 by over 150 nations.
(United Nations 1992) The convention was criticized by environmental groups
for not mandating reductions in greenhouse gas emissions comparable to the
Montreal Protocol commitments on CFCs. Instead, article 4 somewhat
ambiguously obliges industrialized countries to “ adopt national policies and
take corresponding measures”  with the “ aim of returning”  anthropogenic
emissions by 2000 to their levels in 1990. (The 38 industrialized nations are
listed in Annex I of the convention and are thus customarily termed “ Annex I”
countries.) At the present writing in the year before this deadline, it is evident
that only a handful of Annex I countries can achieve this “ aim,”  and those few
only because of exceptional circumstances – a fact that demonstrates how
ambitious the target actually was.
The framework convention is, in fact, much stronger than its true ozone
analogue, which was not the Montreal Protocol but the earlier 1985 Vienna
Convention. The FCCC mandates rigorous national reporting by industrialized
countries on the results of the above-mentioned measures. Significantly, it also
requires the parties to periodically assess the “ adequacy”  of the commitments,
with the clear implication that revisions were intended. Further, the FCCC
recognizes the precautionary principle as a criterion for such action: “ Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such [precautionary]
measures”  (article 3). The FCCC also contains commitments for all parties –
North and South -- to develop national programs “ to mitigate climate change by
addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removal by sinks;”  no
deadlines, however, were set for establishing such programs.
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Like the Montreal Protocol, the FCCC was clearly conceived to establish a
long-term and dynamic process of addressing climate change. In this context, I
believe that the convention’s strongest feature is its “ ultimate objective”  (article
2), against which all future commitments must be measured:
“ The ultimate objective [is to achieve] stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner.”
It is unfortunate that the state of the science, then as now, cannot yet inform us
what level of concentrations would be “ dangerous,”  nor what the desirable time
frame might be.  Even though the lack of such indices complicates the task for
governments to negotiate meaningful quantitative commitments, the concepts
incorporated in the objective are valid guides for action.
At the convention’s First Conference of Parties, in Berlin in early 1995, the
parties had available preliminary findings from the IPCC’s second report. The
IPCC, while somewhat lowering its previous model projections of global
warming and sea-level rise, nevertheless expressed greater confidence in the
revised estimates. Most significantly, the panel for the first time concluded that
the data indicated the presence of “ a discernible human influence on global
climate.”  (IPCC 1996)
Influenced by the IPCC findings, the parties in Berlin formally acknowledged
that the article 4 commitments made in 1992 by industrialized countries were
not adequate. They could not, however, agree on how these commitments
should be strengthened. After heated negotiations, the result was a
compromise: a “ Berlin Mandate”  required the parties to negotiate, by 1997,
“ quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames”  –
otherwise known as targets and timetables – “ for anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks.”
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VI. TORTUOUS TARGETS IN KYOTO
Even industrialized countries differ widely among themselves in geography,
population, natural resource base, climatic conditions, industrial structure, and
dependence on energy. Since these critical parameters are either intrinsic or
immutable in the short run, it is extremely difficult to establish short-term
emissions targets that are both economically feasible and equitable.
Nevertheless, the Kyoto negotiators tried.
The centerpiece of the Kyoto Protocol is the commitment by Annex I countries,
as a group, to reduce their net emissions of a weighted basket of six
greenhouse gases by 5.2 percent below 1990 levels when averaged over the
five-year period 2008-2012. (United Nations 1997) The gases are carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and
sulfur hexafluoride; parties have the option of measuring the latter three gases
against either a 1990 or a 1995 baseline. Within the Annex I group, individual
states committed themselves to differing reduction targets, e.g., 8 percent for
Switzerland, the European Union, and many Central and East European
nations; 7 percent for the United States; 6 percent for Canada, Hungary, Japan
and Poland; 5 percent for Croatia. New Zealand, Russia and Ukraine were not
required by Kyoto to lower emissions below 1990 levels, while negotiators from
Australia, Iceland and Norway were successful in obtaining acquiescence to
higher emissions (article 3).
The 15-nation European Union committed to 8 percent as a bloc. However, it
was understood that inside the EU “ bubble”  11 member states could not attain
this target. Rather, the EU depends on much steeper reductions by Germany
and the United Kingdom to lower the community average. In both these cases,
special circumstances prevailed that were independent of climate change
mitigation policies. Reunified Germany benefited from the 1990 base year that
incorporated high emissions in the former German Democratic Republic before
they plummeted due to economic collapse. In the United Kingdom, the
Thatcher Government’s campaign to weaken the power of coal unions
stimulated switching to natural gas – which is much less carbon intensive.
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As governments appeared unwilling to confront powerful industrial interests
head-on by enacting sector-specific policy measures to limit use of fossil fuels,
e.g., in transportation or utilities, they opted instead for arbitrary short-term
overall targets. The result was that the numbers so feverishly bargained in the
midnight hours at Kyoto bore no relationship to either scientific or economic
realities. The Kyoto Protocol thus inadvertently manages to be simultaneously
far too strong in the short run, and yet far too weak to address the long-term
problem of climate change.
The 11-15 year Kyoto targets are clearly inadequate to make any dent in future
atmospheric concentrations, which is the crucial measure of danger to climate.
Even if the protocol were fully implemented, it would only serve to delay by less
than a decade the date in the next century at which global carbon dioxide
concentrations would cross the 550 parts per million (ppm) mark that
represents a doubling of pre-industrial concentrations. (Edmonds 1999b) In
fairness, Kyoto was intended only as a first step, but its provisions provide no
coherent concept for the future.
Yet how could the protocol also be too strong, when it prescribes no change at
all in total emissions of industrialized countries? As a group, their emissions in
1997 already stood at the 2008-2012 target level of about 5 percent below
1990. Thanks to economic downturn and restructuring following the collapse of
communism, the Eastern European countries together were in 1997 almost 30
percent below their 1990 baseline. (Bolin 1998) When one adds in the German
and British declines already mentioned, total Annex I emissions were already
below 1990 for reasons unrelated to climate mitigation policies.
However, other large emitters, notably the U.S. and Japan, were already well
above 1990 levels and still climbing. U.S. emissions in particular have been
buoyed since 1990 by considerably more vibrant economic activity compared to
that of Europe. The Kyoto commitments could thus translate into emissions
reductions approaching 25 to 30 percent from where they are headed in the
2008-2012 period -- the beginning of which is now little more than 8 years
away. (White 1998, Benedick 1998b)
Difficulties for the U.S. and Canada are compounded by population growth
rates much higher than that of Europe. This means that compliance on a per
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capita basis becomes relatively more onerous -- they are, in effect, being
penalized for having more liberal immigration policies. For the U.S. to meet its
Kyoto commitment, carbon dioxide emissions on a per capita basis would have
to drop to levels not seen since the end of World War II. In contrast, 1995 per
capita emissions in the European Union were only slightly above its Kyoto
target. (Meyerson 1998) The population inequity factor becomes even more
significant in future years: according to the latest United Nations projections
(medium, or “ most likely”  variant), the U.S. population by 2050 will be 37
percent higher than in 1990, while the populations of Japan and Germany will
decrease by 15 percent and 8 percent, respectively. (United Nations Population
Division 1999)
In the relatively short time available, cuts of the required magnitude cannot be
achieved without scrapping major capital investments in power plants,
factories, transport systems, and buildings, before they are obsolete – which
means high costs and economic disruption. For the U.S., achieving the Kyoto-
mandated reductions would require the kind of pressure that could come only
from politically unacceptable high carbon taxes. (Nordhaus and Boyer 1999;
Kopp 1997) Only five years ago President Clinton failed to get even a 5 cent
per gallon gasoline tax increase from a Congress then controlled by his own
party.
Nor is it a foregone conclusion that the EU will be able to reach its Kyoto
commitment. There are signs that Germany, whose domestic 21 percent
reduction goal is vital to achieving the European Union’s overall 8 percent
target, may be faltering in its progress. German carbon dioxide emissions
began to creep upward in 1995, affected by increases from the transportation
and household sectors; partial data for 1997 showed a slight rise from the
industry sector. It appears that following the initial hefty decline after the 1990
East German dividend, some additional relatively easy steps were taken to
stimulate energy conservation and efficiency. But the low-cost no-regrets
strategies have apparently been exhausted. (Klepper 1999) Germany’s
situation is particularly sensitive because of persisting high unemployment,
which increases the political risks of taxes or other costly instruments. The
beleaguered Social Democrat/Green coalition government, reeling from
unanticipated electoral defeats in 1999, may now be reluctant or unable to
implement harder measures.
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In 1996, carbon dioxide emissions were also on the rise in other EU member
states that had set substantial domestic reduction goals in order for the EU as
an entity to meet its Kyoto target – notably, the U.K., Netherlands and Belgium.
(CDIAC 1999) Unless additional strong measures are adopted, the European
Commission itself estimated in May 1999 that EU emissions by 2010 would rise
to 6 percent above 1990. (European Commission 1999) OPEC success in
raising crude oil prices in 1999 may come to the rescue by inducing further
energy conservation. But all of these developments bear close watching.
VII. WHEN WILL THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ENTER INTO FORCE?
In an attempt to maximize the efficiency of investments and thereby lower the
economic costs of emissions reductions, the Kyoto Protocol established three
“ flexibility mechanisms:”
(1) joint implementation, whereby an Annex I country could invest in emissions-
reducing projects in another Annex I country and receive some credit
against its own target, provided that such project entails “ a reduction in
emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is
additional to any that would otherwise occur”  (article 6);
(2) a “ Clean Development Mechanism,”  similar to (1) but involving voluntary
projects in developing countries (article 12); and
(3) international trading of emissions rights among the Annex I parties, whereby
a government or company could purchase “ unused”  emissions from abroad
(article 17).
The United States government appears particularly eager to make use of the
mechanisms – especially emissions trading with Russia and Eastern Europe --
as a means of easing the pain of domestic reductions. The U.S. also hopes
that in time even developing countries can be integrated into a global emissions
trading scheme, thereby opening vast potential sources of emissions rights to
the carbon-hungry American economy. But many European nations, politically
committed to costly domestic emissions reduction programs, claim that their
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industries will suffer if U.S. competitors can avoid the equivalent strong
medicine by means of offshore compliance. Thus, there is already serious
disagreement over the extent to which these mechanisms should be permitted
to supplement domestic actions. Moreover, when the time comes for payments,
it is questionable whether the large untied and untraceable transfers of wealth
to former communist and/or developing nations will be politically palatable to
electorates in the West.
The flexibility mechanisms, moreover, have only been established in principle.
Operating details, including definitions, guidelines, rules and procedures,
reporting, accountability and verification, have been postponed for future
deliberation. Although there are precedents for domestic emissions trading
(e.g., sulfur dioxide in the U.S.), nothing comparable has ever been attempted
on a global scale. It will be extraordinarily difficult to negotiate a trading system
for an ephemeral “ commodity”  among nations at widely varying stages of
economic development.
It is not hard to imagine fractious North-South controversy over criteria for
allocating emission rights to developing countries -- according to population
size, for example, as a reward for lax family planning? What happens if a
country, having received hundreds of millions of dollars by selling unused
rights, subsequently elects a democratic government that repudiates the
“ irresponsible actions”  of its predecessor and insists that expanding energy
use and land-clearing is essential to meet the basic needs of a desperate
populace? What kind of bureaucracy would be needed to administer the
system? What potential transaction costs may be involved? What possible
abuses need to be safeguarded against? Will wild price gyrations be modified,
for example via a futures market? Will prices of emissions rights be too low to
stimulate meaningful domestic change in energy use? Or so high that they
foster evasion? The questions multiply quickly.
Another critical issue left unresolved at Kyoto is the determination of “ net
changes in greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removals by sinks
resulting from direct human-induced land use change and forestry activities,
limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation since 1990, measured
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as verifiable changes in stocks ...”  (article 3). As a potentially powerful offset to
emissions from other sectors, this clause is crucial for determining compliance
with the reduction targets.
The U.S. could, for instance, substantially offset its electricity, transportation,
and industrial emissions by reporting carbon absorption due to agricultural soil
uptake as well as forest growth. Europeans, however, are skeptical about
measurement and verification of such sinks. They also argue that they are
being penalized for their more responsible forest management prior to 1990,
which means that they have less deforested area to replant. Further, it will be
extremely hard to distinguish between naturally induced and anthropogenic
changes in carbon uptake by soils and forests. There is not even technical
agreement on definitions for “ afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation.”
Even worse, some developing countries may be tempted to lay waste to old-
growth forests in order to sell credits to Northern entrepreneurs for reforestation
offsets.
Thus, the current situation is characterized both by deep controversies over
fundamental issues and by the possibility that important nations may have
difficulties in meeting their reduction targets. It appears, therefore,
problematical whether the Kyoto Protocol can become binding international law
in its present form. In order for the protocol to enter into force, it must be
ratified by at least 55 nations, including Annex I countries that together
accounted for at least 55 percent of total Annex I carbon dioxide emissions in
1990 (article 25). As mentioned earlier, only 16 small countries – none of them
in Annex I – have ratified as yet.
The chief American negotiator at Kyoto, Stuart Eizenstadt, admitted to the U.S.
Senate in 1998 that it might be “ years”  before the treaty would even be
submitted by the Executive Branch for Senate approval, which requires a two-
thirds majority vote. Eizenstadt also expressed doubt whether the protocol
would enter into force without U.S. ratification. (Franz 1998) This is not
surprising, since the U.S. alone accounts for over 36 percent of Annex I 1990
emissions and, in a rare display of negative unanimity, the Senate in 1997 had
voted 95-0 to reject any protocol that did not contain “ meaningful participation”
by developing countries. Absent Congressional support, the Clinton
Administration has found it impossible even to secure legislation to start
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curbing the still-rising U.S. emissions before formal ratification. Powerful
American industrial interests have mounted a concerted campaign against the
protocol.
A protracted U.S. delay could cause other Annex I countries to pause in their
own ratification process, not least because of worries about competitiveness in
international trade. As doubts grow within the European Union about its own
ability to meet Kyoto targets, its member countries are also not rushing to ratify.
Governmental hesitation fosters a wait-and-see attitude by industry and
discourages the long-term investments needed for an energy transformation.
Unfortunately, the worst of treaties is one that is not credible.
VIII. UNLEARNED LESSONS
Looking back at the relevant lessons from the ozone history discussed earlier,
how do the climate negotiations compare?
1. On the role of science, the IPCC has mobilized the scientific community and
is doing good work. There is general consensus that the greenhouse theory
is robust: if concentrations continue to accumulate indefinitely, potentially
calamitous climate change will occur at some future time. But no one can
yet predict when this might happen, and there is much uncertainty about
possible offsetting or delaying factors, notably cloud cover.
The primary scientific problem affecting the negotiations is the question of
potential harm from gradual climate change. There is no indication of the
probability, timing, location, or severity of the long list of potential negative
impacts ranging from flood and drought to tropical disease and severe
storms. Indeed, scientists agree that some regions would probably benefit
from warming during the next century due to higher agricultural output.
In contrast to climate, the consequences of ozone layer depletion were of
startling clarity: they would be global and fatal, and the anticipated time-
span was a matter of a few decades. Because of this, governments decided
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to take decisive measures even in the absence of proof that CFCs were yet
damaging the ozone layer.
Proponents of strong actions in the climate negotiations have acted as if the
impacts were comparable. But to obtain international agreement on
measures that could entail substantial near-term costs, the dangers avoided
must be more compelling than what a leading scientific advocate recently
conceded were merely “ not implausible.”  (Schellnhuber 1999) Interestingly,
a recent survey indicated that nearly four times as many German scientists
as Americans would make extreme interpretations in order to influence
public opinion on climate change; in all, 60 percent of German scientists felt
this was appropriate, while two-thirds of the Americans expressed
disapproval of the practice. (von Storch and Bray 1999) The negotiations
demonstrate, however, that attempts to compensate for lacunae in evidence
by exaggerated claims often result in damaged credibility.
2. On the question of leadership, no strong country or strong personality has
made mitigating climate change a consistent high priority. To be sure, there
has been no lack of rhetoric when a politician felt there might be some
benefit. President Bill Clinton, for example, after nearly five years in office
introduced a climate-related program in late 1997 by pronouncing the issue
as “ one of the United States’ greatest imperatives for this and future
generations.”  (Benedick 1997b) The tension between the short-term
perspective that has characterized the climate debate, and the century-
scale of the problem itself, has served to inhibit the emergence of genuine
leadership. Not only will “ it”  not happen on the watch of today’s politicians,
it probably won’t even happen on their grandchildren’s watch. Thus, each
government in the negotiations has acted in its short-term interest, not
looking beyond the next election. Any future leadership role will have to be
based on a new vision; one suggested approach is offered in the final
section of this chapter.
3. On the nature of the treaty, Kyoto was, like the Montreal Protocol, designed
to begin a process. But it suffers from its short-term approach to a long-term
problem. By focusing on targets only 11-15 years into the future, the Kyoto
Protocol encourages governments – and industry – to look for short-term
solutions. As a result, capital could be prematurely locked into investments
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that, because of their own intrinsic lifetimes, would inhibit the development,
and raise the costs, of the next generation of technologies that will be
needed to achieve more substantial emissions reductions later in the
century.
Kyoto’s approach is based on faulty premises that predated the start of
climate negotiations nearly nine years ago. They originated, in fact, at the
1988 Toronto Conference referred to above. That conference, following
soon after the acclaimed Montreal Protocol, took precisely the wrong lesson
from the ozone experience: it recommended that governments negotiate an
international treaty requiring industrialized countries to cut greenhouse gas
emissions by 20 percent by the year 2005. As a participant in this
conference, and accepting due co-responsibility for the error, I can aver that
this target was manufactured literally out of thin air. It was argued that
reductions of one percent per year seemed not unreasonable, 2005 was 17
years out (it seemed a long time, then), round it up to 20 percent - and voilà!
This goal became a potent slogan wielded by some European governments
as well as by environmental organizations and other advocates. It surfaced
at every international meeting. It was adopted and pursued during the
formal negotiations by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), a bloc
created in 1991 consisting of approximately 40 countries that feared sea-
level rise. A political target thus became the standard against which all other
proposals would be measured throughout the climate negotiations.
We had forgotten that the first international action to protect the ozone layer
was not the establishment of reductions targets in the 1987 Montreal
Protocol. Rather, it consisted of loosely coordinated decisions made
approximately ten years earlier by the world’s largest CFC producer, the
United States, by Canada, a small producer, and by a handful of importing
countries, to ban the use of CFCs in aerosol spray cans. This policy
measure had the effect of promoting new technologies that soon reduced
emissions by about thirty percent. But if anyone at that time had proposed a
formal target of that magnitude, it is doubtful whether governments would
have embraced it. The relevant lessons from the ozone experience were
that policy measures can lead the way by stimulating technology, and that
targets are effective only when they are realistic.
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4. Unlike Montreal, the climate negotiations alienated the private sector and
sidestepped the issue of new technologies. The exaggerated warnings of
impending catastrophe led to an early hardening of opposition instead of
enlisting progressive elements in industry to start work on solutions.
Because the debate started off with the wrong premises, the climate treaties
played into the hands of the coal and oil, automobile, and other powerful
interests that preferred a do-nothing policy. Rather than providing market
signals that could induce broad technological innovation, serious efforts to
implement Kyoto targets are now more likely to provoke a backlash from
industry, consumers, and taxpayers.
It is, moreover, an incredible inconsistency that the industrialized nations
undertook daunting targets in Kyoto while cutting their investments in
energy research and development. The U.S., Germany, Japan, U.K., and
the European Union (as a separate entity), which together accounted for
more than four-fifths of the world’s public sector long-term energy R&D,
collectively reduced their research budgets between 1985 and 1998 by 35
percent in real terms, or almost $3 billion below 1985 levels. None of the
major industrialized countries currently invests the majority of its energy
R&D in renewable energies. (Dooley and Runci 1999)
5. As for global participation, commitments by the South in the Kyoto Protocol
are conspicuous by their absence. Throughout the negotiations, developing
nations have resisted discussing even voluntary measures to restrain their
emissions.
In the case of ozone, the industrialized world in 1987 accounted for 88
percent of CFC consumption and 98 percent of production. Therefore, their
actions were determining, and the role of developing countries was
secondary. (Benedick 1998a:26,148) In contrast, while carbon dioxide
emissions from fossil fuels and cement production in industrialized nations
have been relatively stable for over twenty years, emissions from
developing countries are on a steep upward trend. Between 1985 and 1995,
the South’s share of global emissions jumped from 29 percent to 44
percent. China’s emissions are already second only to the United States;
India’s have surged by nearly 50 percent since 1990 and are now higher
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than Germany; South Korea has passed Italy, and Mexico’s emissions are
almost as large as France. (CDIAC 1999) Propelled by rapid population
growth and expanding industrialization, the South’s emissions will probably
surpass those of the North in only two to three decades. The above figures
do not even include emissions from biomass energy, destruction of forests
and savannas, and land degradation, which are hard to measure but add
significantly to emissions from the developing world.
With the exception of the small island states and a few others, most
developing nations do not act as if they realize their own vulnerability to the
effects of climate change. Their reluctance to restrict use of cheap fossil fuel
is understandable, given that their top political priority is to improve
standards of living. Unless low-cost alternatives are available, they are
unlikely to accept commitments that will primarily benefit future generations.
It is also unrealistic to expect them to act as long as industrialized countries,
which became rich in the process of causing the current climate
predicament, appear unable or unwilling to take credible steps themselves.
Regrettably, the South’s arguments only reinforce worries in the North
about the impact of higher energy costs on their own international
competitiveness. Because energy production and consumption involve
sizable long-term investments, the South risks getting locked into a fossil
fuel economy in future decades that will make it progressively harder for
them to modernize.
IX. TIME TO MOVE ON: A LONGER TERM PERSPECTIVE
It is difficult to admit that so much work has produced so little. One respected
analyst has characterized the Kyoto Protocol as “ a pinnacle of both economic
and environmental globalisation.”  (Grubb 1999) He regards as a hopeful
“ achievement”  that, at the divisive 1998 conference in Buenos Aires held one
year after Kyoto, governments submitted a list of no less than 142 topics for
which further negotiation was considered necessary! Most recently, the parties
27
to the FCCC, including ministers from 60 countries, assembled in Bonn in
November, 1999, for two more weeks of intensive negotiations. The best that
could be achieved was an exhortation to resolve the outstanding issues by the
next conference, currently scheduled for late 2000.
Can the climate negotiations be reinvigorated? As a start, an attitudinal change
would be helpful. Governments and NGOs could turn down the political rhetoric
and stop reacting to every variation of the thermometer. We should ignore the
apocalyptic warnings that emerge after every heat wave and hurricane, as well
as the scientific “ revelations”  that are conveniently released on the eve of
every negotiating session. It would be more candid to admit that the science is
likely to remain imprecise for some time, and to move on.
Even with the aid of powerful computer models, complex interrelated natural
processes are inherently difficult to predict. For biogeochemical systems,
analysts admit that, “ even if a model result is consistent with the present and
past observational data, there is no guarantee that the model will perform at an
equal level when used to predict the future.”  This is so not only because small
input errors can generate significant deviations when extrapolated over long
time periods, but also because dynamic natural systems may react in
unexpected ways (Oreskes et.al. 1994; Sarewitz and Pielke 1999).
Notwithstanding, a persuasive case can be made that the potential dangers of
climate change are sufficiently serious that actions should not be postponed
until impacts are evident. There is an additional risk of crossing some
unforeseen threshold – a sudden and irreversible climate disruption brought on
by greenhouse gas concentrations passing a certain level. This risk is
intrinsically non-quantifiable; but it is not zero. The Antarctic ozone collapse
demonstrated that when we perturb the atmosphere, it does not necessarily
respond with convenient early warning signals.
At this point we should return to basics -- namely, the ultimate objective of the
FCCC. Pending further scientific evidence, we could establish a tentative goal
for carbon dioxide concentrations – for example, 550 parts per million, a
doubling of pre-industrial levels, would be about 50 percent above current
concentrations. The target could later be modified to reflect both unfolding
scientific knowledge and experience with technology. But it would at least
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provide a perspective for starting a sequence of actions over the coming
decades. To achieve even this concentration target would require that current
annual global emissions be cut at least in half by the end of the next century
(Edmonds 1999b, 1999c).
One of the premier American scientific institutions, the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory operated by Battelle for the U. S. Department of Energy,
has made climate change a major priority for its researchers. Much of the
following discussion is based on their analyses. Physicists, chemists, biologists,
economists and engineers at Battelle are engaged in a broad range of projects
exploring potential energy from biochemical processes, hydrogen
transformation, microtechnology, and other futuristic sources. They are also
examining the potential for carbon capture and sequestration, an option that
could supplement new energy sources and substantially lower costs by
permitting continued use of fossil fuels without burdening the atmosphere.
Other Battelle research focuses on such related fields as technology policy,
energy economics, local climate impacts, and new structural materials for
vehicles.
Battelle’s analyses make clear that greater energy efficiency, fuel switching,
and expansion of existing renewable energies (solar, wind, biomass, etc.),
while necessary, will not go far enough to enable the deep emissions
reductions required in the latter half of the next century. What is needed is no
less than a technology revolution in the energy sector.
The long atmospheric lifetime of most greenhouse gases means that
concentration levels for the next century are to a great extent already
predetermined by past emissions, and are therefore not significantly affected
by short-term emissions cuts. However, researchers at Battelle and its partners
have demonstrated that any given concentration level depends more upon
cumulative emissions than upon their timing. This is a crucial point, for it
thereby becomes possible to achieve a future concentration goal by choosing
among differing alternative trajectories of emissions reductions. Such flexibility
can significantly lower the costs of transforming the energy sector (Wigley
et.al. 1996, Edmonds 1999c).
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Emissions in 2008-2012 are thus much less important than what happens in
2040, 2060, 2080. Recent Battelle research indicates that early offsets to
emissions through soil carbon sequestration can buy additional time for future
steep reductions. (Rosenberg et.al. 1999) In sum, the analyses show that we
do have time, provided that we use it well: emissions can be allowed to drift
upward for awhile -- as long as we undertake actions to ensure that later
emissions are substantially lower (Edmonds et.al. 1997).
X. A TECHNOLOGY-BASED STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE:
EIGHT POINTS FOR ACTION
What kind of actions might these be? The dangers of long-term global warming
can only be averted if we (1) bring to market a new generation of cost-effective
technologies that will drastically reduce dependence on fossil fuels and/or will
capture and sequester carbon, and (2) gain the cooperation of key developing
countries to limit their rapidly rising emissions. Fortunately, the two conditions
are interrelated: as we achieve the first, we will get the second.
As the ozone history amply demonstrated, when cost-effective technologies
start becoming available, developing countries are more likely to join the
bandwagon and adopt modern methods. Technology functions as the
“ enabler,”  without which the high emissions reductions required in the latter
half of the coming century will not materialize. We need, therefore, a new
strategic vision that explicitly addresses issues of technology research,
development, and diffusion.
Not only are the time-consuming negotiations to resolve the flaws of Kyoto not
bringing the parties closer to consensus, they actually prevent governments
from focusing on more realistic measures. The Kyoto Protocol has become the
victim of polarized debate over inconsequential short-term emissions,
compounded by large uncertainties about the short-term costs of compliance.
The existing treaty provides inadequate attention to the technological
imperative and to securing the cooperation of developing nations. The current
debates distract attention from the real challenge, which is to set the stage for
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reducing emissions to less than half of 1990 levels within the next century, and
holding them there indefinitely.
A combination of better technology and a realistic schedule of emission
reductions would significantly lower mitigation costs, which might otherwise be
prohibitive, in both North and South. Battelle models suggest that technology
could make a difference of trillions of dollars in the global cost of mitigating
climate change (Edmonds 1999c). Major near-term cost savings could also be
realized by avoiding the “ stranding”  of assets: existing plants and related
infrastructure investments should, generally, be allowed to complete their
useful lives. Companies should be provided with some security that future
energy investments will not be made obsolete by new rounds of politically
inspired targets that are not based on science. Buying time would also permit
scientists to make further refinements in their climate models and thereby gain
more insight into the impacts of climate change, especially their scope, timing,
and location. This would help both in mobilizing public support for action, and in
providing better guides for policy. The entire process would become politically
more acceptable.1
A technology strategy is only defensible, however, if it is does not become an
invitation to delay. Much must be done right now to start the process. Here is a
possible eight-point program of action for the negotiators.
1. Revise and simplify the emissions targets. To begin, I recommend that
governments streamline the Kyoto emissions commitments to make them
more credible. The near-term targets should be revised in magnitude and
should focus primarily on gross carbon dioxide emissions. (Methane, which
has a short atmospheric lifetime and is difficult to measure, could be
temporarily left out; however, the three fluorinated greenhouse gases, which
have currently relatively low emissions but potentially powerful future
impact, should be restricted.) More realistic and verifiable initial targets for
                                           
1
 Against this background, Battelle has organized an international consortium of research institutes, private
companies, and government agencies to develop a global energy technology strategy. The broad scope of this
initiative includes: the potential future contribution to carbon management of different technologies; the
applicability of specific technologies to the varying circumstances of different regions, in particular China and
India; barriers to research collaboration; strategies to promote technology diffusion and market penetration; and
augmenting soil absorption of carbon through agricultural techniques. This multi-year program could be a
paradigm for the type of public-private partnerships that will be indispensable for transforming the world’s future
energy economy.
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industrialized countries would have a better chance of being implemented.
Hence, they would be taken more seriously by industry as well as by the
onlooking developing world. As new technologies emerge, it will be
politically easier to strengthen targets over time.
2. Postpone the sinks. The attempt to reflect net emissions targets is
scientifically justifiable, but the complexities surrounding the land-use and
forestry provisions of article 3 are, in my opinion, a formula for delay.
Therefore, the comprehensive approach should be abandoned, at least
temporarily. The net emissions concept should be re-introduced after
technical experts have made it implementable, but action on reducing gross
carbon emissions should not wait for this refinement.
3. Defer emissions trading. For all of the reasons enumerated earlier, I
would also shelve for the time being the disputatious negotiations on
creating an international emissions trading scheme.
4. Get on with technology transfer and joint implementation. Governments
and industry in the industrialized countries should undertake serious efforts
– as they did under the Montreal Protocol – to expeditiously transfer new
energy-related technologies to the developing world, and should help build
indigenous capacity to develop local energy solutions. North-South and
West-East joint implementation investments make sense from the
standpoints of both economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness.
The Clean Development Mechanism (which is the most promising element
of the existing protocol) should be activated to promote greater energy
efficiency and expansion of renewable energy in the developing nations.
The North should provide climate-relevant assistance as a cost-effective
form of foreign aid rather than primarily to earn emissions offset credits. All
of this would probably be far less costly and more productive than large
wealth transfers to buy emissions “ rights” .
5. Get serious about policy measures. In a test of political will, the
emissions targets should be reinforced by harmonized policy measures.
Stricter vehicular fuel-efficiency standards (which everyone, including the
automakers, knows are feasible), and energy-related government procure-
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ment policies, could provide strong impetus to innovation. Existing market
distortions and subsidies that favor fossil fuels should finally be eliminated.
Incentives should be adopted to promote further development and market
penetration of renewable energies, in order to realize economies of scale
that would make them more competitive. If it proves too difficult to negotiate
legally binding policy commitments, an interim fallback might be to require
transparent and rigorous reporting; experience in the IMF and OECD has
shown that the need to report regularly to peers can be an incentive to
change policies for the better.
6. Consider technology-based objectives. Analysts are exploring possible
technology-based goals that governments could employ to stimulate future-
oriented R&D. Since virtually all carbon in modern energy economies flows
through power generation and fuel refining/processing, such policies could
be quite specific in their focus. For example, new power generation plants
constructed after a certain date could be required either to use renewable
energy or to capture and dispose of carbon byproducts. Similarly, new fossil
fuel refining and processing facilities after a given date would also have to
be carbon neutral. (To encourage R&D before the phaseout deadline,
interim targets could be scheduled for new plants, as well as credits
provided for early compliance.) Additionally, fossil fuels could be employed
as a feedstock for hydrogen, but any carbon releases would have to be
sequestered. Net imports of carbon-based fuels could gradually be phased
out in the second half of the century. Because these measures apply to
sizable industrial facilities, they are conducive to transparency, reporting,
and monitoring for compliance. Such actions are feasible, and would
provide the market with signals for focused research without imposing
unrealistic generic targets that could cripple innovation.(Edmonds and Wise
1999, Edmonds et.al. 1999).
7. Invest in a technological revolution. Most important of all, governments
must ensure that sufficient financial resources are made available to
achieve the needed technological revolution. Reaching a critical mass of
R&D is basic to fostering technological breakthroughs. Governments cannot
stand back and expect that the private sector, with its relatively short time
horizon, will make all the required long-term R&D investments. Although
credible targets and policy measures can help to stimulate industry’s
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creativity, the scale of the climate/energy challenge requires that the public
sector take the lead role. Even a small carbon tax could raise substantial
revenues for funding new technology research. For example, a tax of four
dollars per ton of carbon in the U.S., representing only one cent per gallon
of gasoline, could generate approximately $5.6 billion and enable current
public sector energy R&D to grow more than threefold.
OECD members should commit themselves to raising their grossly
inadequate level of basic and applied energy research by a significant (and
annually rising) percentage of civilian research programs. And they should
collaborate in R&D, especially with developing nations and with the private
sector. Given the stakes, energy research arguably merits a degree of
public sector commitment comparable to that devoted not long ago to
aerospace and telecommunications. The leverage that such research would
provide in reducing the future costs of addressing climate change makes it
an eminently sound investment.
8. Negotiate in a more efficient forum. In the interest of speeding the
process, most if not all of these actions – especially the research initiatives,
policy measures, technology transfer, and technology goals -- could be
negotiated and implemented by like-minded nations, North and South,
outside the FCCC context (and perhaps later presented to the larger forum.)
It is imperative to closely involve the handful of developing nations whose
emissions really matter. There is no moral stricture, however, that requires
concerned governments to negotiate every relevant action within the
unwieldy context of over 170 nations and thousands of observers. The
OECD and the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference come to mind as
plausible alternatives.
Together, the above efforts would greatly increase the likelihood of making
existing renewable energy more competitive, making carbon capture and
sequestration more feasible, creating new energy sources, and engaging
developing countries. Perhaps by making a fresh start with new concepts,
we could achieve the progress that has been so elusive up until now.
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